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In the standard Krugman (1979) non-CES trade model, several asymmetric countries
typically lose from increasing trade costs. However, all countries transiently benefit
from such increase at the moment of closing trade, under almost-prohibitive trade
costs (i.e., near autarky, which is possible only under non-CES preferences). In other
words, during trade liberalization the first step from autarky to trade is necessarily
harmful. Our explanation rests on market distortion and business destruction effects.
Keywords: Trade gains, monopolistic competition, variable elasticity of substitu-
tion, free trade, autarky.
JEL Codes: F12, L13, D43.
1Sobolev Institute of Mathematics SB RAS, NSU, and NSUEM, bykadorov.igor@mail.ru
2Department of Management of University Ca’ Foscari Venezia, ellero@unive.it
3Department of Management of University Ca’ Foscari Venezia, funari@unive.it
4National Research University Higher School of Economics, and NSU, skokov7@gmail.com
5National Research University Higher School of Economics, PSMolchanov@edu.hse.ru
6We are indebted to Evgeny Zhelobodko (1973-2013) who started this study, to Jacques-Francois Thisse for
encouragement, to Kristian Behrens, Federico Etro, Sergey Kichko, Yasusada Murata, Alexander Tarasov, Fed-
erico Trionfetti, Philip Ushchev, Natalia Volchkova and Dao-Zhi Zeng for valuable comments. Also we gratefully
acknowledge financing of this project by grant 15-06-05666 from RFBR, grant SSD SECS-S/06, 571/2014 from
Department of Management of University Ca’ Foscari Venezia. Also, we express deep gratitude to Economic
Education and Research Consortium, whose grants 08-036 and 11-5231 intiated this direction of our research,
and to EERC excellent experts Richard Ericson, Shlomo Weber, Michael Alekseev, Jim Leitzel, Sasha Skiba for
wise advices and profound comments.
2
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759872 
1 Introduction
Gains from trade is an evergreen topic. In New Trade theory, this theme again generated vivid
discussion (see [Melitz and Redding, 2015], [Behrens et al., 2014]) after [Arkolakis et al., 2012]
puzzled theorists with surprisingly low estimated gains amounting to not more than 1.4% of
GDP for the US. One of the possible explanations is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
assumption, which dominates in this discussion. Rare exceptions include [Behrens and Murata,
2007] and [Dhingra, 2013] that find the assumption of variable elasticity of substitution (VES)
to be more realistic and discuss related “pro-competitive” effects, promising additional gains.
However, under VES, [Arkolakis et al., 2015] finds lower estimated trade gains than under com-
parable CES demand (we will return to this fact in our concluding remarks). Moreover, under
VES, free trade may show welfare loss in comparison with autarky. [Bykadorov et al., 2015b]
show such harmful trade under general-form preferences and non-linear costs. Necessary and
sufficient condition for welfare diminishing free trade equilibrium is “misaligned revenue and
utility,” originating from [Dhingra and Morrow, 2012 ]. The explanation is distortion, aggra-
vated by trade. However, misalignment assumption looks too stringent to support belief in
real-life harmful free trade on these grounds.
By contrast, this paper discovers harmful costly trade under very high trade costs, near
autarky—under any additive VES utilities enabling autarky. As to trade gains, they occur near
free trade, at least under realistic preferences. In other words, the gains from gradual trade
liberalization are non-monotonic, and are eventually positive, but in the beginning are negative.
Thus, the first step from autarky is harmful.7
A similar effect is known for oligopoly ([Brander and Krugman, 1983]), but our setting is
different and standard for the New Trade theory. Our model is a version of Krugman’s gen-
eral one-sector monopolistic competition ([Krugman, 1979]), with unspecified additive utili-
ties, and without outside good. Homogeneous firms use one production factor (labor), having
uniform fixed and marginal costs, and consumers are also identical (similar model is stud-
ied in [Zhelobodko et al., 2012], [Mrázová and Neary, 2014], [Bykadorov et al., 2015a] but for
symmetric countries). For analytical tractability, in the difficult case of asymmetric countries,
our model includes only two types of economies: G -countries with great populations, and L -
countries, which can be little or equal to G . Labor markets do clear, and trade is balanced.
At the equilibrium, any pair of countries can trade or not, depending on the level of iceberg
trade cost. Thereby we introduce a new, convenient version of an asymmetric multi-country
Krugman’s trade model (hopefully useful for other studies). However, the assumption of two
country-types is mostly expositional, and not crucial for our results. It is not essential for the
effect of decreasing welfare near autarky, because it is natural to expect that trade liberaliza-
tion invites country types into trade one-by-one, not every type simultaneously. Therefore, the
“painful birth of trade” effect is general, and allows for the presence of arbitrary number of
country types, though not everybody is involved into the first step of liberalization.
In our model, the evolution of trade is driven by the decreasing trade cost coefficient τ and
progresses in four steps. At first, liberalization departs from “complete autarky,” i.e., from pro-
hibitively high cost τ out. At this stage, “selective trade” arises among certain pairs of countries,
afterwards “comprehensive trade” among everybody follows. Finally, the evolution arrives at
free trade under zero trade cost (τ = 1). Here, near free trade, welfare locally increases in each
country with liberalization (under realistic, decreasingly elastic utilities). It is generally not
7This effect is firstly found in our discussion paper [Bykadorov et al., 2015a] for two countries and generalized
now to multi-country world and incomplete autarky.
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surprizing. However, increasing gains for G -countries appear non-evident in view of gradually
decreasing and vanishing wage advantage (higher wages in a larger country). Unlike in a CES
economy, which has negligible change of variety (mass of firms) under free trade, in our model,
welfare increases despite a decreasing mass of firms. From the policy viewpoint, this fact means
that “business destruction” by trade liberalization is not necessarily harmful.
More subtle and unexpected is the effect at the beginning of liberalization, near complete
autarky. Autarky is possible under any additive utility that has a choke-price, which is a
finite derivative at zero. This feature ensures locally-decreasing elasticity of utility at zero
and increasingly elastic demand near autarky. Under this assumption, we prove that all prices
decrease during this initial stage of trade liberalization near autarky, and export increases, but
variety (the mass of firms) shrinks due to competition from foreign firms (see Figure 1). The
latter effect dominates, so welfare deteriorates in each country, i.e., harmful trade takes place.
In other words, market distortion is aggravated by the initiation of trade.8
The explanation for this phenomenon is “business stealing,” which means externalities. In-
deed, when all firms and consumers start trading, they correctly anticipate direct mutual ben-
efits, but they do not take into account the spillovers to other firms and consumers in general
equilibrium in the form of shrinking domestic variety of goods in response to emerging import.
This noticeable reduction in variety is not compensated by small arising import. This fact is
not intuitive and becomes clear only from algebraic argumentation. The mechanism of welfare
reduction in this model is quite different from that of the oligopolistic “painful birth of trade,”
well-known after [Brander and Krugman, 1983] (see the comparison after Proposition 2). By
contrast, in the standard New Trade theory this effect looks new and surprising. Probably,
it was overlooked so far, because of dominant CES model, which excludes complete autarky.
Additionally, our simulations (Figure 1) show how this paradoxical welfare gain from increasing
trade costs is tightly connected with increase in variety, and also ensures that this effect is not
negligible in size and zone of presence. The gain in welfare can occur rather far from complete
autarky, at the moment when some pair of countries “partially” terminates mutual trade, while
each still maintains trade with other countries (third parties). Relaited claim (Conjecture 3)
formulates a realistic condition, when a mutual pairwise trade barrier between two countries is
beneficial for them, even in the presence of continuing trade with third parties. This finding
means that harmful small-scale trade is not exotic, and appears robust to any compositions
of countries and any additive (non-CES) preferences enabling autarky. Additionally, in our
discussion of consumer surplus, we provide a simple explanation for a negative answer to the
question posed in [Arkolakis et al., 2015]: “Does the fact that trade liberalization affects firm-
level markups, as documented in many micro-level studies, make ... [gains from trade] ... larger
or smaller?”
Finally, the interesting effect of harmful trade is found to be robust to extensions, e.g.,
the assumption of firms’ heterogeneity. However, the magnitude of harm becomes smoother
than without heterogeneity, hardly noticeable. Therefore the effect is unlikely to be observed
empirically in practice. Yet, practical is the idea that essential gains occur mainly near free
trade, while a small first step towards trade brings negative or zero welfare gains.
To summarize: our paper supports [Arkolakis et al., 2015] in the sense that a VES economy
may produce smaller trade gains than a CES one. Moreover, we predict that due to VES effects,
trade liberalization initially must be harmful. From the policy viewpoint, this claim sounds
8This effect happens in all three possible situations at trade termination: either couple L −L breaks its
trade, or G −L , or G − G couple.
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protectionist, but in fact it only suggests not to liberalize trade gradually, and that is better to
jump over initial losses, or just wait until transport costs decrease sufficiently for massive trade.
This recipe looks somewhat similar to the “infant industry” argument for postponing trade, but
the mechanism is very different, and is not connected with time and learning. It is not young
trade but low-volume trade that appears detrimental in this model.
2 Model: Trade among Gullivers and Lilliputians
The world economy consists of K + 1 great countries—“Gullivers” (e.g., the US, the EU
and China) and k + 1 “little” countries—“Lilliputians” (K ≥ 0, k ≥ 0). To rely on the proofs
and explanations in our working papers [Bykadorov et al., 2015c], [Bykadorov et al., 2015a], the
exposition of the present model follows almost the same notations; all variables for Gullivers
(respectively, Lilliputians) are displayed in capital (resp., lowercase) characters, such notation
economizes on the use of subscripts. The only production factor is labor, supplied inelastically by
L identical consumers/workers in each Gulliver country (resp., l in Lilliputian), and we assume
L ≥ l, not excluding L = l. Furthermore, Γ = L · (K + 1) + l · (k + 1) is the total number
of consumers in the world. Our single-sector economy exhibits monopolistic competition and
involves an endogenous interval [0, N ] (resp., [0, n]) of identical firms producing varieties of a
differentiated good, one variety per firm. Wages can differ, namely, wG ≡ w denotes the wage
in each big country, whereas wL ≡ 1 is the (normalized) wage in each small country.
Each consumer in a Gulliver country maximizes her utility using three kinds of variables:
Xi – the domestic consumption of the i-th variety; Yi – the imported consumption of the i-th
variety from another big country; and zi – the imported consumption of the i-th variety from a
Lilliputian country. A representative consumer in a Gulliver country maximizes (subject to the
budget constraint) her utility given by
ˆ
0
N
u (Xi) di+K ·
ˆ
0
N
u (Yi) di+ (k + 1) ·
ˆ
0
n
u (zi) di→ max{X,Y,z},
ˆ
0
N
PXi Xidi+K ·
ˆ
0
N
P Yi Yidi+ (k + 1) ·
ˆ
0
n
pzi zidi 6 w,
where prices PXi , P Yi , pzi correspond to consumptions Xi, Yi, and zi respectively.
Similarly, the problem of a representative consumer in a Lilliputian country is
ˆ
0
n
u (xi) di+ k ·
ˆ
0
n
u (yi) di+ (K + 1) ·
ˆ
0
N
u (Zi) di→ max{x,y,Z},
ˆ
0
n
pxi xidi+ k ·
ˆ
0
n
pyi yidi+ (K + 1) ·
ˆ
0
N
PZi Zidi 6 1,
where prices pxi , p
y
i , P
Z
i correspond to consumptions xi, yi, Zi, respectively (Zi denoting export
from a Gulliver to a Lilliputian, xi – domestic consumption, yi – import from similar small
country).
The restrictions on elementary utility u (as in [Mrázová and Neary, 2014]), imposed for
existence and uniqueness of each consumer’s/producer’s response to any market situation (and
5
equilibrium), are standard for VES models: u is thrice differentiable, strictly concave, increasing
at least on some interval [0, zˇ), where zˇ ≡ arg maxz u(z) denotes the satiation point (possibly
infinite). Additionally, using the Arrow-Pratt concavity operator rg(z) ≡ − zg′′(z)g′(z) (defined for
any function g), we formulate the restrictions on concavity of u, concavity of u′ and behavior
of the functions at zero as
{0 < ru(z) < 1 & ru′(z) < 2 ∀z ∈ [0, zˇ)}, u(0) = 0,
u′(0) <∞, u′′(0) > −∞, u′′′(0) ∈ (−∞,∞).
In other words, u has finite derivatives at zero, which differs from the CES assumption.
Using these assumptions and the consumer’s first order conditions (FOC), we standardly
derive six inverse demand functions, one for each kind of variables:
PXi =
u′ (Xi)
Λ
, P Yi =
u′ (Yi)
Λ
, pzi =
u′ (zi)
Λ
, (1)
pxi =
u′ (xi)
λ
, pyi =
u′ (yi)
λ
, PZi =
u′ (Zi)
λ
, (2)
Here Λ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers for the Gulliver/Lilliputian budget constraints. The
marginal utility of income Λ serves as the main market aggregator in country G , similar to the
price index (the role of λ for country L is analogous).
Producers. The output (size) of the i− th firm in a Gulliver country is given by
Qi (Xi, Yi, Zi) = L ·Xi +K · τ · L · Yi + (k + 1) · τ · l · Zi
while the output (size) of the i− th firm in a Lilliputian country is
qi (xi, yi, zi) = l · xi + k · τ · l · yi + (K + 1) · τ · L · zi,
where τ ≥ 1 is the usual regular iceberg trade cost coefficient. Then, total costs take the form
C (Qi) = c ·Qi + F, C (qi) = c · qi + F,
where F is the fixed requirement and c is the marginal requirement of labor. It is standard to
show the symmetry of producers’ behavior, so, it is possible to omit the index i.
Introducing the “normalized revenue” R (ξ) = u′ (ξ) · ξ and using the demand functions, the
profit maximization program of a firm in a Gulliver country can be written as
max
(X,Y,Z)
Π ≡ L · R (X)
Λ
+K · L · R (Y )
Λ
+ (k + 1) · l · R (Z)
λ
− w · C (Q (X, Y, Z)) . (3)
Similarly, the profit maximization program in a Lilliputian country is
max
(x,y,z)
pi ≡ l · R (x)
λ
+ k · l · R (y)
λ
+ (K + 1) · L · R (z)
Λ
− C (q (x, y, z)) . (4)
Standardly, each firm perceives the market aggregates (λ,Λ) parametrically, being “small.”
Labor balances mean full employment of labor at the equilibrium. In the two kinds of
countries they can be written as
N · C (Q) = L, n · C (q) = l. (5)
6
Trade balances express the idea that the value of all exported goods equals the value of
imported goods. In Gulliver and Lilliputian countries the balances are, respectively
N ·
(
K · L · R (Y )
Λ
+ (k + 1) · l · R (Z)
λ
)
= N ·K · L · R (Y )
Λ
+ n · (k + 1) · L · R (z)
Λ
,
n ·
(
k · l · R (y)
λ
+ (K + 1) · L · R (z)
Λ
)
= n · k · l · R (y)
λ
+N · (K + 1) · l · R (Z)
λ
.
Rearranging the equations above, these two trade balances turn into one equation (which would
not be the case under three or more types of countries):
N · l · R (Z)
λ
= n · L · R (z)
Λ
.
Further, substitutingN and n from the labor balances (5), we rewrite each trade balance without
N and n as
R (Z)
λ · C (Q) −
R (z)
Λ · C (q) = 0. (6)
Zero-profit conditions (free-entry) at equilibrium are
Π = 0, pi = 0 , (7)
and a producer’s first order conditions (FOC) are
∂Π
∂X
= 0,
∂Π
∂Y
= 0,
∂Π
∂Z
= 0,
∂pi
∂x
= 0,
∂pi
∂y
= 0,
∂pi
∂z
= 0. (8)
Standardly, the second order condition (SOC) under linear costs can be rewritten in terms of
normalized revenue R as
R′′ (ξ) < 0, ξ ∈ {X, Y, Z, x, y, z},
which holds true under our assumptions (ru′(z) < 2) and guarantees symmetry of producers’
behavior.
(Symmetric) equilibrium is the bundle of consumptions, wages, prices, masses of firms,
and market aggregates(
X∗, Y ∗, Z∗, x∗, y∗, z∗,Λ∗, λ∗, w∗, N∗, n∗, PX
∗
, P Y
∗
, PZ
∗
, px
∗
, py
∗
, pz
∗)
that satisfy all the equations imposed, namely:
• utility maximization (1) and (2),
• labor and trade balances (5) and (6),
• free entry (7),
• profit maximization (8).
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As is usual, the budget constraints entail the labor balances, which explains too many constraints
for five groups of variables.
Welfare. Each Gulliver country’s welfare (measured in consumers’ total utility) is expressed
as
W G = L · (N · (u (X) +K · u (Y )) + n · (k + 1) · u (z))
and each Lilliputian country’s welfare is measured similarly:
WL = l · (n · (u (x) + k · u (y)) +N · (K + 1) · u (Z)) .
Using the labor balance (5), both welfare functions can be reformulated without variables N, n,
as
W G = L ·
(
L · u (X) +K · u (Y )
C (Q)
+ l · (k + 1) · u (z)
C (q)
)
, (9)
WL = l ·
(
l · u (x) + k · u (y)
C (q)
+ L · (K + 1) · u (Z)
C (Q)
)
. (10)
Global welfare is not addressed in this analysis.
3 Welfare Consequences of Trade Liberalization
Our goal is to show U-shaped evolution of per-country gains from trade during liberalization,
which means decreasing trade costs. Specifically, our analytical proof concerns only initial
losses (decreasing welfare) near autarky, and ultimate gains (increasing welfare) near free trade,
whereas simulations describe the evolution of welfare and variety in more detail.
3.1 Numerical example
To begin with, let us discuss a numerical example given in Figure 1. Unlike our propositions,
it tells the complete story of trade liberalization, not only autarky and free trade stages. The
evolution of equilibria is displayed under the following parameters: three big countries (K = 2)
have populations of L = 3 each, and three small countries (k = 2) have l = 1. Marginal cost is
c = 3.33 and fixed cost is F = 1. The consumer’s elementary utility belongs to the Augmented
Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion type (which includes CES and almost-linear demand as
special cases):
u(x, a,m) =
(a+ 1)m+1 ((a+ x)1−m − a1−m)
1−m − ax
with a = 1 and m = 0.25. In this example, when trade cost τ increases, the countries
drop out of trade in three steps. At first, trade stops among the three Gullivers, then it
ceases between any Gulliver and any Lilliputian, and finally it disappears among three Lil-
liputians, who are the most interested in trade (such a sequence of trade termination, with
smaller countries halting trade later, appears to be a general rule, although we cannot prove
this fact so far). At this final moment τ out3 the world reaches complete autarky. In for-
mal terms, we observe here three trade-breaking points τ out1 < τ out2 < τ out3 . For any ε > 0,
trade goes below such points, but it stops at the points, i.e., [Y (τ out1 ) = 0, Y (τ out1 − ε) > 0],
[Z (τ out2 ) = z (τ
out
2 ) = 0, Z (τ
out
2 − ε) > 0, z (τ out2 − ε) > 0] and [y (τ out3 ) = 0, y (τ out3 − ε) > 0]. In
our simulation, these points are τ out1 ≈ 1.43, τ out2 ≈ 1.59 and τ out3 ≈ 1.79. The evolution of such
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Figure 1: Changing variety and welfare under growing trade cost (L = 3 = 3l, K = 2 = k,
c = 3.33, F = 1).
economy shown in Figure 1 describes the behavior of two equilibrium variables – variety and
welfare under increasing τ .
One can see that welfare is non-monotonic and has a unique global minimum, both for
Gullivers and Lilliputians. Gullivers here reach minimum welfare approximately at τ ≈ 1.38
within the initial interval τ ∈ (1, τ out1 ) = (1, 1.43), in which all countries do trade. After this,
their welfare grows in τ , reaches point τ out1 , at which point the Gulliver-Gulliver trade ceases,
and grows further until τ out2 ≈ 1.59, at which point Gullivers drop out of any trade and therefore
become indifferent to trade cost τ . By contrast, Lilliputians reach minimum welfare at τ ≈ 1.50
within another interval [τ out1 , τ out2 ), and they do not have a local minimum near τ out1 . After
minimum at τ ≈ 1.50, their welfare grows in τ until the point τ out2 , stabilizes for a moment,
then grows again in τ until the complete autarky point τ out3 = 1.79. Thus, in this example, at
each moment when trade ceases, welfare grows for those who cease to trade. In other words, we
always observe the “happy agony of pairwise tradeï¿½ under increasing trade costs, which can be
rephrased as “painful birth of pairwise trade” under decreasing trade costs. In the upper part of
the graph, two curves depicting the masses of firms N(τ), n(τ) show that the increase of trade
cost typically pushes overall variety up (thereby, consumption of each variety goes down). This
fact sheds some light on the mechanism affecting welfare. It is increasing variety that enhances
welfare whenever it grows with τ . Another observation is that the interval of harmful trade is
rather significant in this example: τ ∈ (1.38, 1.79], and the amount of harm (the magnitude
of the drop in welfare) is also noticeable. This loss amounts to about 14% of the maximal
possible gain from free trade. Moreover, gains from trade occur only on the interval [0, 1.38).
Comparing it with typical estimates of the contemporary average trade-cost coefficient (e.g.,
[Melitz and Redding, 2015] reports τ ≈ 1.8), one can suggest that contemporary trade gains in
a big country indeed can be very small as claimed in [Arkolakis et al., 2012], even negative, or
that future gains from further trade liberalization may many times exceed those observed today.
Of course, these rough comparisons are far from serious calibration, we cannot insist on them.
Instead, our theoretical message is that essential trade gains should occur near free trade, not
in the beginning or middle of liberalization.
The crude geometric explanation of “the reward at the end of the road” of liberalization can
be illustrated through the demand triangle under linear demand. Under trade liberalization
9
τ → 1, the marginal cost for export τc decreases from infinity to c, it means decrease of the
horizontal line restricting the profit rectangle (p − τc)q from below. If not for exit of firms
in response, this change would influence both, the maximal profit quadratically as (a − τc)2/4
and consumer surplus as (a − τc)2/8 (where a denotes the choke-price). It means that both
these components of “gains” in the beginning (a ≈ τc) should have a zero derivative in τ , then
slightly increase, but hike up sharply in the end. However, in general equilibrium, exit of firms
somewhat diminishes the consumers’ welfare during this process and thus generates the welfare
pit observed in the beginning of liberalization in Figure 1, thereby enforcing the difference
between the beginning and the end of the process. Generalizing this reasoning to non-linear,
more convex demands, would make the welfare increase even steeper than quadratic one. This
explains the huge difference between initial and final gains. This example shows, that during
liberalization, half of the way from autarky to free trade may go in vain. This looks as strange as
“almost negligible” trade gains found by [Arkolakis et al., 2012]. Common sense would expect
the opposite: that the first gulp of freedom is the most desired one by countries “thirsty for
trade,” the last step being less important because of “satiation with freedom.” Surprisingly,
geometry and algebra tell us the opposite: the last gulp contains the greatest rewards.
3.2 General propositions
Now we prove that some effects observed in this example are robust to various modifications
of preferences. The main assumption u′(0) < ∞ of our analysis excludes only utilities which
do not generate autarky like CES functions u(x) = xρ (but include functions u(x) = (x + ε)ρ
arbitrarily close to CES). Under such general conditions, it is not easy to prove the U-shape
(quasi-convexity) of whole welfare curve, but we are able to show analytically, that welfare
decreases at the beginning and increases at the end of trade liberalization. To demonstrate this,
we obtain the total derivative for the equilibrium equations with respect to τ (see Supplementary
Appendix) and arrive at the following two propositions about changing equilibria. The first one
looks natural: at free trade conditions, a growth of trade cost brings harm to everybody, in
other words, liberalization is benefitial near free trade. Small countries react more sensitively
than big countries.
Proposition 1. Under pro-competitive utility (r′u > 0), when trade cost τ increases near free
trade (τ ≈ 1), domestic consumption, output and all prices also increase, while the mass of
firms, imports and welfare W G , WL decrease in each country; moreover, the speed of these
changes obey the following inequalities
dx
dτ
>
dX
dτ
> 0,
dq
dτ
>
dQ
dτ
> 0,
dN
dτ
<
dn
dτ
< 0,
dn
dτ
· 1
n
<
dN
dτ
· 1
N
< 0 (τ ≈ 1).
Thus, prices react to trade cost pro-competitively under r′u > 0, and the impact of trade
costs on firm size is stronger for smaller countries but the impact on the mass of firms is weaker.
A decrease in welfare is natural. More surprising is another proposition. It describes the “happy
agony of trade” between two countries when τ grows, or the “painful birth of trade” when τ
decreases, i.e., trade freeness φ ≡ 1/τ increases. In its formulation, to encompass any pair of
traders: (Lilliputian-Lilliputian), (Gulliver-Gulliver) or (Gulliver-Lilliputian), we replace (with
a little abuse of notation) our upper-case notations X, N with lower-case letters xj, nj and
denote all imports Y or Z or z or y — by variable yij where i, j ∈ {G ,L }.
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Proposition 2. Starting from complete autarky φaut, when trade liberalization begins,9 and any
two countries of types i, j ∈ {G ,L } start trading, the local reaction of domestic consumption
levels xi, xj is negligible (
(
dxk/dφ
) |φ=φaut = 0, k ∈ {G ,L }); consumption of imports increases
((dyij/dφ) |φ=φaut > 0, i, j ∈ {G ,L }), whereas the mass of firms and welfare decrease in both
countries:
dnk
dφ
|φ=φaut < 0, dW
k
dφ
|φ=φaut < 0, k ∈ {G ,L }.
So, φaut belongs to a mesurable interval [φaut, φ1) of freenes φ where trade brings harm (in
comparison with autarky) to all trading countries.
Proof of happy agony of trade under two symmetric countries. To explain the
mechanism of this effect, we prove the proposition in the simple case of two small symmetric
countries (see general proof in Appendix). Let K = 0, k = 0, l = 1 = L and w = 1 . The
equilibrium equations will then contain only two FOCs and one zero-profit condition:
c =
R′(x)
λ
, cτ =
R′(z)
λ
(11)
C(Q) =
R(x)
λ
+
R(z)
λ
. (12)
To show that x′τ = 0 and z′τ < 0 at the autarky point, we totally differentiate these conditions
in τ :
0 =
R′′(x)
λ
x′τ −
R′(x)
λ2
λ′τ , (13)
c =
R′′(z)
λ
z′τ −
R′(z)
λ2
λ′τ , (14)
x′τ + z + τz
′
τ =
R′(x)
λ
x′τ +
R′(z)
λ
z′τ −
(
R(x)
λ2
+
R(z)
λ2
)
λ′τ . (15)
Recalling that z = 0 = R(0) at autarky, then substituting equations (11) into (15) we obtain
the derivative of λ:
c (x′τ + τz
′
τ ) = c (x
′
τ + τz
′
τ )−
(
R(x)
λ2
)
λ′τ ⇒ λ′τ = 0.
Plugging this result into the remaining equations (13)-(14) we achieve x′τ = 0 and the sign of
z′τ as needed:
c =
R′′(z)
λ
z′τ ⇒ z′τ < 0.
To find welfare changes at autarky, we totally differentiate the country’s reduced-form welfare
W (9) in trade costs τ :10
9Trade liberalization means that trade cost τ decreases, φ increases.
10In the reduced-form welfare (9), the loss from decreasing variety ∆N < 0 is equivalent to the loss from
increasing cost of production ∆C > 0.
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W ′τ (x, z) =
[u′(x)x′τ + u
′(z)z′τ ]C(Q)− C ′(Q) ·Q′τ · [u(x) + u(z)]
C2(Q)
=
=
[u′(x)x′τ + u
′(z)z′τ ]C(Q)− c · [x′τ + z + τz′τ ] · [u(x) + u(z)]
C2(Q)
.
To simplify this expression, we use conditions (11)-(12) and the properties z = 0 = u(0) = R(0),
x′τ = 0 at the autarky point:
W ′τ (x, z) =
u′(z)z′τ
R(x)
λ
− R′(z)
λ
u(x)z′τ
C2(Q)
= (16)
=
z′τ
C2(Q)λ
[
u′(z)
u′(x)x
u(x)
u(x)− (u′(z) + u′′(z)z)u(x)
]
=
z′τu
′(z)u(x)
C2(Q)λ
[
u′(x)x
u(x)
− 1
]
> 0.
Here, because u
′(x)x
u(x)
< 1 due to the concavity of the utility function u, and z′τ < 0 at autarky,
we conclude that W ′τ (x, z) > 0, i.e., welfare increases in τ . Q.E.D.
The formulae above explain why increasing trade cost τ brings benefit near autarky: two effects
oppose each other. The harm from diminishing imports z is displayed by the negative first
summand in the numerator of marginal welfare in (16), whereas the positive second summand
indirectly shows welfare from an increasing mass of firms and variety in each country. Further
algebraic transformations show that the latter effect does outweight the first one (no economic
intuition can explain why!). Regarding this fact from the opposite perspective, trade liberaliza-
tion near autarky always brings harm, because its impact on import consumption is not strong
enough to outweigh the negative impact of business destruction and consequent reduction of
product variety.
This effect (harmful trade near autarky) is new in New Trade literature. Under the CES
assumption, harm was never found because CES excludes complete autarky (i.e., excludes any
zeros in the export matrix). However, a similar effect, a harmful birth of trade is well known since
1983 in oligopolistic models with homogeneous good ([Brander and Krugman, 1983]). In this
paper, the effect stems from strategic behavior and market power in oligopoly, differing from our
mechanism of losses, which involves distortion among differentiated varieties within monopolis-
tic competition (a more realistic market structure). In modern literature based on monopolistic
competition models, only [Chen and Zeng, 2014] finds similar harm in a two-factor trade model
with footloose capital, but does not provide a clear explanation. We suppose that the effect in
[Chen and Zeng, 2014] stems from labor/capital substitution and international capital migra-
tion. Therefore, our “harm from trade” based on distortion appears to be a phenomenon novel
to New Trade. As a cautionary warning, we must mention [Behrens et al., 2014] that criticize
any conclusions about welfare under monopolistic competition, because empirically we infer
the consumers’ utilities only from some demand integration, whereas the unknown constant of
integration may influence our welfare predictions.
Partial termination of trade. Let us discuss a more subtle situation than complete
autarky. Should any agony of pairwise trade caused by a growing cost bring benefit to the
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Figure 2: Changing variety and welfare under growing trade cost τ when small countries are
numerous (K = 2, k = 30, L = 2, l = 1).
traders? This is the case at point τ out2 in our example in Figure 1. Indeed, near the intermediate
termination point τ out2 welfare locally increases for everybody. By contrast, near τ out1 welfare
increases only for Gullivers, terminating their mutual trade but not for Lilliputians (a third
party). Here, any parties stopping trade always win. By contrast, in our second example, when
Gullivers stop trade with Lilliputians, the former win but the latter lose.
Example 2 describes a world with numerous Lilliputian countries, and few big countries,
the parameters set at K = 2, k = 30, L = 2, l = 1, F = 1, c = 3.33, a = 1, m = 0.25. Then
the impact of increasing trade cost τ is described by the following simulated figures.
To comprehend non-reciprocal gains from G −L trade termination here, observe that the
large group of Lilliputians is the most important trading partner for any country, G or L . Con-
sequently, Lilliputians do not care when the two Gullivers terminate trade with L group, only
these Gullivers become happier at this moment (as in Proposition 2) and also when terminating
trade with each other. By contrast, during these two dropouts of G group, the Lilliputians con-
tinue bearing losses from increasing cost and decreasing trade with each other. Only their own
dropout – the transition to complete autarky, brings a (transitory) benefit to L group. Thus,
we observe that it is not guaranteed that everbody always benefit from partially terminating
trade (under increasing common trade cost τ). From similar arguments, it looks probable that
there exists a situation where nobody benefits from increasing τ at a non-final termination of
trade. To build such an example, the mass of Lilliputians must be very high to outweigh any
small benefits to Gullivers from G − G trade termination.
Impact of separately changing trade cost τij between a couple of countries. One
more similar question is the following: assume that termination of pairwise trade between some
countries i, j occurs because only their bilateral trade coefficient τij (e.g., tariff) increases, while
the trade costs τks for the rest of the world remain constant and other trade flows remain positive.
Without formulating a cumbersome general model of such situation, we are now able to sketch
out the scheme of proof that such separate pairwise “agony of trade” should be “happy.” These
arguments indirectly show why the governments of two trading countries may have reasons to
apply some tariff or non-tariff barriers to suppress negligible mutual trade, while maintaining
substantial trade with third parties (countries).
For example, suppose that world consists of (k + 1) Lilliputians and only two Gullivers
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numbered #1, #2. What happens, when the mutual trade coefficient τ12 = τ21 between Gullivers
decreases, starting from a prohibitive value τ out21 , while all other coefficients coefficients τks in
the world remain constant? One can prove that the level of Gullivers’ trade with third parties,
Lilliputians, remains almost unaffected by decreasing separate G − G coefficients τ12 = τ21.11
Then estimating the welfare consequences of separate trade liberalization between countries #1,
#2 amounts to comparing the benefit of emerging imports ∆Y > 0 to the loss from decreasing
variety ∆N < 0. The latter is equivalent, as we know, to the loss from increasing cost of
production ∆C > 0. So, we can differentiate the reduced-form welfare function (9) in variable
τ12 which is the same as differentiating it in Y (at Y = 0). We obtain the expression
d
dτ
W G ≈ − ∂
∂Y
W G = −L
2Kc
C (Q)
·
[
u′ (0)
c · τ21 −
u (X)L+ u(z)l · (k + 1)
C (Q)
]
.
Applying the same transformations as in the proof of Proposition 2, we can conclude that loss
from increasing trade freeness (starting from τ out21 ) occurs if and only if
u′ (0)
c · τ out21
<
u (X)L+ u(z)l · (k + 1)
f + L ·X · c+ l · (k + 1) · Z · c · τ .
This condition, after replacing cost by revenue and then simplifying, becomes
u′ (0)
R′(0)
= 1 <
u (X)L+ u(z)l · (k + 1)
R(X)L+ R(Z)
λ/Λ
l · (k + 1) .
Further, using trade balance R(Z)
λ/Λ
= R(z)·C(Q)
C(q)
between this Gulliver and remaining trade partners
(k + 1 Lilliputians) we obtain
u′ (0)
R′(0)
= 1 <
u (X)L+ u(z)l · (k + 1)
R(X)L+ R(z)·C(Q)
C(q)
l · (k + 1) .
We see, that whenever a firm in Gulliver has (plausibly) equal or bigger total cost than a
firm in Lilliputian (C (Q) ≥ C (q)), exploiting u(z) > R(z), we arrive at the conclusion of
“harmful trade.” Indeed, each summand in the numerator of the right-hand side is larger than
its counterpart in the denominator. Using a reasonable weaker assumption R(z)·C(Q)
u(z)·C(q) ≤ 1, we
summarize these arguments by formulating the following claim (which is incompetely proved,
because the model with asymmetric τij was not formulated exactly and its trade balances are
non-trivial).
Conjecture. Consider the situation with near-zero trade level Y ≈ 0 between two Gullivers
i, j ∈ {G ,G }, where the relative size of firms in Gullivers and Lilliputians is not too big, in the
sense that
C (Q)
C (q)
≤ u (z)
R (z)
,
and assume that the separate pairwise trade coefficient τij decreases (i.e., freeness φij increases),
and these two countries start trading (dY ij/dφij > 0, Y ij ≈ 0). Then welfare decreases in both
these countries:
dW k
dφij
< 0, k ∈ {i, j}.
11Indeed, repeating the arguments in the proof of Proposition 2, it is possible to prove that trade magnitudes
(Z, z) between G and L should have a zero first derivative in τ12 at τout21 , because Z, z (as well as X) depend
on τ only indirectly, through variables λ,Λ, whereas these market statistics have zero derivatives in τ at τout.
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Supporting the assumption C(Q)
C(q)
≤ u(z)
R(z)
used here, we must say that we have always ob-
served smaller firms in the bigger country (C(Q)
C(q)
< 1) in all numerical examples that we have
explored. This fact is guaranteed near autarky under the realistic assumption of increasingly-
elastic demand function, because in this case production of a variety decreases in population of
a closed economy (see [Zhelobodko et al., 2012]); also, Proposition 1 indirectly states C(Q)
C(q)
≤ 1
in situations near free trade.12 Under another demand function—CES, firm size Q = q does
not change, but the assumption holds as well. However, being unable so far to prove inequality
C(Q)
C(q)
≤ 1 with arbitrary τ, u, we have used a weaker inequality R(z)·C(Q)
u(z)·C(q) ≤ 1 as an assumption.
In particular, the latter inequality always holds true for similar countries having Q ≈ q, because
R(z)
u(z)
< 1.
Thus, exploring rather realistic situations during trade liberalization, when first small coun-
tries start trading, than big ones, we have found that any two big countries (maybe already
trading with other partners) should suppress their arising mutual trade whenever it is small in
volume, for welfare reasons.
Heterogeneous firms. Another modification to the model shows that the harmful trade
effect near complete autarky is robust not only to various preferences but also to heterogeneous
firms. Following [Bykadorov et al., 2015a], we argue that firms’ heterogeneity does not matter
at the moment of closing trade. Argumentation for this claim is as follows. When trade
cost τ reaches the critical level τ out, the last firms that leave the scene of trade are only the
most efficient ones, this group of actors is homogeneous (or approximately homogeneous, if we
take a measurable subset of approximately-best firms). Thereby, at the moment of complete
autarky the heterogeneous economy reacts to trade costs as a homogeneous one. In other
words, Proposition 2 applies here, ensuring that trade freeness is initially harmful even under
heterogeneous firms.13
As to the magnitude of this effect, heterogeneity should smoothen the initial welfare loss dur-
ing trade liberalization, at least when continuous spectrum of firms is essentially heterogeneous.
When freeness increases and a new cohort of firms step into trade bringing related initial losses,
the old cohort already trading increases its exports, which may outweigh the losses from new
cohort. Moreover, the “cutoff” threshold for the surviving firms may also change. Trade pushes
out the inefficient firms, and thereby increases welfare through the selection effect emphasized
in [Melitz and Redding, 2015].
In view of these considerations and noticeable firms’ heterogeneity in real life, the chances
to discover harmful initial trade in the empirical data are slim. Instead of searching for such
examples, this paper only argues that noticeable gains from trade liberalization are not likely
to occur at the onset. In particular, surprisingly small estimates of current trade gains in
[Arkolakis et al., 2012] and [Arkolakis et al., 2015] can be explained as follows: the world is
now in the middle of globalization, far from free trade. However, our explanation of why the
VES assumption in [Arkolakis et al., 2015] brings smaller gains than the CES assumption in
[Arkolakis et al., 2012] is different. One can simply compare a demand “triangle” with a CES
12Indeed, in free trade, Q = q; moreover (see Lemma 2 in Appendix), near free trade
dQ
dτ
= (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER ≤ (Γ− l) ·
r′u ·X2
rR · ER =
dq
dτ
under L ≥ l; therefore, Q ≥ q when τ ≈ 1, τ > 1.
13To be more pricise, to prove applicability of Proposition 2, one should formulate a cumbersome general
model and exploit zero derivatives of variables λ,Λ, negligibly influencing “unimportant variables,” as explained
in the proof of Conjecture 3 above.
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demand curve to linear demand. Both demands should have the same slope at the “realistic”
price level, because their elasticities are similarly estimated at this point only in the papers
named. Which model promises a higher trade gains? The linear demand is strictly inside the
CES “demand triangle,” and has a smaller total area (potential consumer surplus). Such inclu-
sion makes any estimated gains from trade under a flat demand smaller than the estimated gains
under CES hypothesis, and thus explans the driving force of the effect in [Arkolakis et al., 2015].
Returning to the explanation of the surprising “painful birth of trade,” we repeat that the
reason for such welfare loss is “business stealing” by imports. The mass of domestic firms shrinks
too fast in response to emerging imports, being insufficiently compensated by the arising insub-
stantial import. Comparative strength of these opposite effects is demonstrated algebraically
in (16) but lacks an intuitive explanation because of interplay of several forces. The harmful
distortion results from market spillovers inflicted by each trading firm and its buyers. These
indirect spillovers turn out to be stronger than the direct benefit of trade to the actors who
voluntarily start it (similarly, increasing freedom sometimes leads to a worse Nash equilibrium
in game theory).
In conclusion, we should stress the contrast between the (surprising) harm during the first
steps of gradual trade liberalization—and the large welfare gains at the last step of globalization.
Only the last stage brings essential benefits. The moral of the story for trade policy is: Do
not liberalize trade gradually but rather jump over the pit at once, since the main
reward is at the end of the road.
4 Appendix
4.1 Preliminaries
For our proofs we introduce necessary notations.
In what follows, for function f (ξ), we use notations for its elasticity
Ef (ξ) =
f ′ (ξ) · ξ
f (ξ)
and its Arrow-Pratt measure
rf (ξ) = −f
′′ (ξ) · ξ
f ′ (ξ)
= −Ef ′ (ξ) .
Note that concavity of utility u restricts its elasticity as Eu (ξ) < 1 ∀ξ > 0.14
In comparative statics of equilibria, for any equilibrium variable ϕ (for consumption, price,
etc.) its total elasticity w.r.t. trade cost τ is denoted as
Eϕ = Eϕ/τ = dϕ
dτ
· τ
ϕ
.
Also recall the notation for “normalized revenue” R (ξ) = u′ (ξ) · ξ.
14Indeed, for every∀ξ > 0,Eu (ξ) < 1 ⇐⇒ u′ (ξ) · ξ − u (ξ) < 0 ∀ξ > 0. Consider the function g (ξ) =
u′ (ξ) · ξ − u (ξ) . One has g′ (ξ) ≡ u′′ (ξ) · ξ < 0 ∀ξ > 0 due to strictly concavity of u. But g (0) = u (0) = 0.
Hence g (ξ) < 0 ∀ξ > 0, i.e., u′ (ξ) · ξ − u (ξ) < 0 ∀ξ > 0.
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Now the Second Order Conditions (SOC) for profit maximization can be written as (cf.
[Zhelobodko et al., 2012])
ru′ (ξ) < 2 ∀ξ ≥ 0. (17)
Recall that the output (size) of each firm in a Gulliver country is given by
Q = Q (X, Y, Z) = L ·X +K · τ · L · Y + (k + 1) · τ · l · Z,
while the output (size) of each firm in a Lilliputian country is
q = q (x, y, z) = l · x+ k · τ · l · y + (K + 1) · τ · L · z.
Further, we express masses N and n from the labor balances
N =
L
C (Q)
, n =
l
C (q)
and respectively express the trade balance as
TB ≡ R (Z)
λ · C (Q) −
R (z)
Λ · C (q) = 0.
Recall the expressions for profits
Π ≡ L · R (X)
Λ
+K · L · R (Y )
Λ
+ (k + 1) · l · R (Z)
λ
− w · C (Q (X, Y, Z)) ,
pi ≡ l · R (x)
λ
+ k · l · R (y)
λ
+ (K + 1) · L · R (z)
Λ
− C (q (x, y, z)) .
Thus, the system of equilibrium equations includes all FOC, two zero-profit conditions and trade
balance:
∂Π
∂X
= 0,
∂Π
∂Y
= 0,
∂Π
∂Z
= 0,
∂pi
∂x
= 0,
∂pi
∂y
= 0,
∂pi
∂z
= 0. (18)
Π = 0, pi = 0 , (19)
TB = 0. (20)
4.2 Comparative statics w.r.t. τ : general case
Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions in trade cost τ , we get the following basic
lemma for comparative statics, describing the total derivatives/elasticities of the equilibrium
variables.
Lemma 1. The total derivatives of the equilibrium variables can be expressed as
dX
dτ
=
1
τ
· EΛ + Ew
R′′ (X)
R′ (X)
,
dY
dτ
=
1
τ
· EΛ + Ew + 1
R′′ (Y )
R′ (Y )
,
dZ
dτ
=
1
τ
· Eλ + Ew + 1
R′′ (Z)
R′ (Z)
, (21)
dx
dτ
=
1
τ
· Eλ
R′′ (x)
R′ (x)
,
dy
dτ
=
1
τ
· Eλ + 1
R′′ (y)
R′ (y)
,
dz
dτ
=
1
τ
· EΛ + 1
R′′ (z)
R′ (z)
, (22)
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where EΛ , Eλ , Ew are the total elasticities of Λ, λ, w w.r.t. τ , being the solutions to three linear
equations
L·
(
R (X)
Λ
+K · R (Y )
Λ
)
·(EΛ + Ew)+(k + 1)·l·R (Z)
λ
·(Eλ + Ew)+R
′ (Z)
λ
·(K · L · Y + (k + 1) · l · Z) = 0,
(23)
(K + 1) ·L ·R (z)
Λ
·EΛ + l ·
(
R (x)
λ
+ k · R (y)
λ
)
·Eλ+R
′ (z)
Λ
·(k · l · y + (K + 1) · L · z) = 0, (24)
EC (Q) · EQ − EC (q) · Eq − ER (Z) · EZ + ER (z) · Ez + (Eλ − EΛ) = 0, (25)
and
dQ
dτ
= L · dX
dτ
+K · L ·
(
Y + τ · dY
dτ
)
+ (k + 1) · l ·
(
Z + τ · dZ
dτ
)
, (26)
dq
dτ
= l · dx
dτ
+ k · l ·
(
y + τ · dy
dτ
)
+ (K + 1) · L ·
(
z + τ · dz
dτ
)
. (27)
Proof of Lemma 1.15 Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (18)–(20) w.r.t. τ ,
we obtain the system
d
dτ
(
∂Π
∂X
)
= 0,
d
dτ
(
∂Π
∂Y
)
= 0,
d
dτ
(
∂Π
∂Z
)
= 0,
d
dτ
(
∂pi
∂x
)
= 0,
d
dτ
(
∂pi
∂y
)
= 0,
d
dτ
(
∂pi
∂z
)
= 0,
dΠ
dτ
= 0,
dpi
dτ
= 0,
d
dτ
(TB) = 0.
Due to additive separability of profits in its variables, the former six equations (total derivatives
of FOC (18)) are simplified as
R′′ (X)
Λ
· dX
dτ
− R
′ (X)
Λ2
· dΛ
dτ
− C ′ · dw
dτ
= 0,
R′′ (Y )
Λ
· dY
dτ
− R
′ (Y )
Λ2
· dΛ
dτ
− τ · C ′ · dw
dτ
− w · C ′ = 0,
R′′ (Z)
λ
· dZ
dτ
− R
′ (Z)
λ2
· dλ
dτ
− τ · C ′ · dw
dτ
− w · C ′ = 0,
R′′ (x)
λ
· dx
dτ
− R
′ (x)
λ2
· dλ
dτ
= 0,
R′′ (y)
λ
· dy
dτ
− R
′ (y)
λ2
· dλ
dτ
− C ′ = 0,
R′′ (z)
Λ
· dz
dτ
− R
′ (z)
Λ2
· dΛ
dτ
− C ′ = 0.
Expressing the elasticities EΛ, Eλ, Ew through FOC, we obtain the needed equations (18), (22).
Further, plugging (18), (22) into the next two equations (total derivatives of free entry
conditions (19)) we obtain the needed equations (23), (24).
15More detailed proof of the lemma can be found in [Bykadorov et al., 2015c].
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Finally, plugging (18), (22) into the latter equation (the total derivative of trade balance
(20)) we obtain the long equation
− R (Z) · C
′
λ · (C (Q))2 ·
(
L · dX
dτ
+K · τ · L · dY
dτ
+ (k + 1) · τ · l · dZ
dτ
)
+
R′ (Z)
λ · C (Q) ·
dZ
dτ
+
+
R (z) · C ′
Λ · (C (q))2 ·
(
l · dx
dτ
+ k · τ · l · dy
dτ
+ (K + 1) · τ · L · dz
dτ
)
− R
′ (z)
Λ · C (q) ·
dz
dτ
+
+
R (z)
Λ · C (q) ·
1
τ
· EΛ − R (Z)
λ · C (Q) ·
1
τ
· Eλ+
+C ′ ·
(
R (z) · (k · l · y + (K + 1) · L · z)
Λ · (C (q))2 −
R (Z) · (K · L · Y + (k + 1) · l · Z)
λ · (C (Q))2
)
= 0.
Now, using obvious expressions (26), (27) for outputs derivatives dQ
dτ
, dq
dτ
through the correspond-
ing derivatives of consumptions, the latter equation becomes (25), that completes the proof.
4.3 Proof of Proposition 1: Free Trade
Recall the formulation of
Proposition 1. Assume pro-competitive utility (r′u > 0). Starting from free trade τ ≈ 1, when
(negligible) trade cost increases, any country’s domestic consumption, output and all prices
increase, while the masses of firms, imports and welfare W G , WL in any country decrease;
moreover
dx
dτ
>
dX
dτ
> 0,
dq
dτ
>
dQ
dτ
> 0,
dN
dτ
<
dn
dτ
< 0,
dn
dτ
· 1
n
<
dN
dτ
· 1
N
< 0 (τ ≈ 1).
Proof. This proposition considers the situation of free trade, i.e., τ = 1. Then, the location
of a firm and destination of its output does not matter, that means
X = Y = Z = x = y = z, w = 1, Λ = λ, Q = q = ((K + 1) · L+ (k + 1) · l) ·X = Γ ·X,
where Γ denotes the total population of the world. Such symmetry enables simplification of
our numerous notations as follows: R ≡ R (X) = R (Y ) , R′ ≡ R′ (X) = R′ (Y ) , C ≡ C (Q) =
C (q) , ER ≡ ER (X) , EC ≡ EC (Q), etc. Similar symmetric simplification of our totally dif-
ferentiated equations (21)–(25) is also correct after the differentiation. However, for expressing
the resulting coefficients, we shall need the equilibrium equations expressed for the free trade
case as simplified FOC and free entry conditions
R′ = Λ · C ′, (28)
Γ ·R = Λ · C, (29)
that together entail equality between elasticities of cost and revenue (as in closed economy):
EC = ER (≡ 1− ru) . (30)
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We shall need notations for welfare functions of countries type G and L , that in free trade
situation become16
W G = L · (N · (1 +K) + n · (k + 1)) · u = L · (L · (1 +K) + l · (k + 1)) · u
C
= L · Γ · u
C
,
WL = l · (n · (k + 1) +N · (K + 1)) · u = l · Γ · u
C
.
Lemma below is the main part of proof of Proposition 1, containing also interesting additional
information about elasticities.
Lemma 2. In free trade, the masses of firms N = L
C
≥ l
C
= n are proportional to
populations; total elasticities of the wage differential and market aggregators Λ, λ in τ are
Ew = L− l
Γ
· ER ∈ [0, 1] , (31)
Eλ = −
(
−L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR − 1
ER + rR
+ Γ− l
)
· ER
Γ
< 0, (32)
EΛ = −
(
l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR − 1
ER + rR
+ Γ− l
)
· ER
Γ
, (33)
and if r′u ≥ 0 then EΛ < EΛ + Ew < 0. Moreover, the total derivatives of consumptions and
outputs satisfy conditions
dX
dτ
= −X
rR
· (EΛ + Ew) , dY
dτ
= −X
rR
· (EΛ + Ew + 1) , dZ
dτ
= −X
rR
· (Eλ + Ew + 1) , (34)
dx
dτ
= −X
rR
· Eλ > 0, dy
dτ
= −X
rR
· (Eλ + 1) , dz
dτ
= −X
rR
· (EΛ + 1) , (35)
dQ
dτ
= (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER ,
dq
dτ
= (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER . (36)
Further, total derivatives and elasticities of the firms’ masses have the sing opposite to r′u because
dN
dτ
= −Γ · L · (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X3
C · rR , EN = −Γ · (Γ− L) ·
r′u ·X3
rR
,
dn
dτ
= −Γ · l · (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X3
C · rR , En = −Γ · (Γ− l) ·
r′u ·X3
rR
.
Finally, the sign of total derivatives of welfare depends on the sign of r′u as
dW G
dτ
= − L · u
Γ · C · rR ·
(
AG +BG · r′u ·X
)
, (37)
dWL
dτ
= − l · u
Γ · C · rR ·
(
AL +BL · r′u ·X
)
, (38)
16Non-importantly for our argument but interestingly, the total world welfare depends on population quadrat-
ically: W = (K + 1) ·WG + (k + 1) ·WL = Γ2 · u
C
.
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where three of the four coefficients have definite sign:
AG = (Γ · L ·K + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− L+ l + (L− l) ·ru)) · rR · Eu
ER + rR
> 0, (39)
BG = (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) · ((1− Eu) · ER + r
′
u ·X)
(ER + rR) · ER , (40)
AL = Eu ·
(
L · (K + 1) · (L− l) · rR · ER
ER + rR
+ Γ · (Γ− l) · ru
)
> 0, (41)
BL = L · (K + 1) · (L− l) · Eu
ER + rR
+ (l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l) + L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L)) > 0. (42)
Remark. For revealing the signs of the coefficients, note that rR > 0 due to SOC, see
(17), and under r′u > 0 the positive sign BG > 0 is guaranteed (using footnote 1), therefore
dWG
dτ
< 0, dW
L
dτ
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.17 From Lemma 1, substituting X = Y = Z = x = y = z into (21)
and (22) we get expressions (34) and (35) for total derivatives of consumptions.
As to equations (23)–(25) from Lemma 1, at free trade they become
L · (1 +K) · (EΛ + Ew) + (k + 1) · l · (Eλ + Ew) + (K · L+ (k + 1) · l) · ER = 0,
L · (1 +K) · EΛ + (k + 1) · l · Eλ + (k · l + (K + 1) · L) · ER = 0,(
C ′
C
· dQ
dτ
+ Eλ
)
−
(
C ′
C
· dq
dτ
+ EΛ
)
− R
′
R
· dZ
dτ
+
R′
R
· dz
dτ
= 0,
and solving these equations we obtain equalities (31)–(32). The sign Ew > 0 is obvious. As to
sign of Eλ, we can evaluate it as
Eλ = −
(
−L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR + ER − ER − 1
ER + rR
+ Γ− l
)
· ER
Γ
=
= −
(
−L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
+ L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· ER + 1
ER + rR
+ Γ− l
)
· ER
Γ
=
= −
(
Γ · (Γ− l)− L · (K + 1) · (L− l)
Γ
+ L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· ER + 1
ER + rR
)
· ER
Γ
=
= −
(
L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)
Γ
+ L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· ER + 1
ER + rR
)
· ER
Γ
< 0.
Similarly, we can evaluate the sign of the sum of elasticities
− (EΛ + Ew) =
(
l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR − 1
ER + rR
+ Γ− L
)
· ER
Γ
=
=
(
l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR + ER − 1− ER
ER + rR
+ Γ− L
)
· ER
Γ
=
=
(
l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR + ER − 1
ER + rR
− l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· ER
ER + rR
+ Γ− L
)
· ER
Γ
=
17More detailed proof of the lemma can be found in [Bykadorov et al., 2015c].
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=(
l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· r
′
u ·X
(ER + rR) · ER −
l · (k + 1) · (L− l) · ER − Γ · (Γ− L) · (ER + rR)
Γ · (ER + rR)
)
·ER
Γ
=
=
(
L− l
Γ
· l · (k + 1) · r
′
u ·X
(ER + rR) · ER −
(l · (k + 1) · (L− l) + Γ · (Γ− L)) · ER − Γ · (Γ− L) · rR
Γ · (ER + rR)
)
·ER
Γ
=
=
(
L− l
Γ
· l · (k + 1) · r
′
u ·X
(ER + rR) · ER +
(l · (k + 1) · (Γ− L+ l) + Γ · L ·K) · ER + Γ · (Γ− L) · rR
Γ · (ER + rR)
)
·ER
Γ
.
Hence, if r′u ≥ 0 then EΛ < EΛ + Ew < 0 and this part of lemma is proven.
Now, we are able to calculate the expressions for total derivatives of outputs
dQ
dτ
= L · dX
dτ
+K · L · dY
dτ
+ (k + 1) · l · dZ
dτ
+Q− L ·X =
= −X
rR
· (L · (EΛ + Ew) +K · L · (EΛ + Ew + 1) + (k + 1) · l · (Eλ + Ew + 1)) +Q− L ·X =
= −X
rR
· ((K + 1) · L · (EΛ + Ew) + (k + 1) · l · (Eλ + Ew) +K · L+ (k + 1) · l) + (Γ− L) ·X =
= −X
rR
· (− (K · L+ (k + 1) · l) · ER + Γ− L) + (Γ− L) ·X = (Γ− L) · rR + ER − 1
rR
·X =
= (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER ,
dq
dτ
= l · dx
dτ
+ k · l · dy
dτ
+ (K + 1) · L · dz
dτ
+Q− l ·X =
= −X
rR
· (l · Eλ + k · l · (Eλ + 1) + (K + 1) · L · (EΛ + 1)) +Q− l ·X =
= −X
rR
· (− (k · l + (K + 1) · L) · ER + (K + 1) · L+ k · l) + (Γ− l) ·X =
= (Γ− l) · ER + rR − 1
rR
·X = (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER .
Thus, we have obtained expressions (36).
Further, using the labor balances and the obtained derivatives (and thereby elasticities) of
outputs together with (30), we get the elasticities of N, n:
EN = −EC(Q) = −EC · EQ = −EC ·Q · (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER =
= −Q · (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X2
rR
= −Γ · (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X3
rR
,
En = −EC(q) = −EC · Eq = −EC ·Q · (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER =
= −Q · (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X2
rR
= −Γ · (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X3
rR
,
and related derivatives
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dN
dτ
= −N · Γ · (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X3
rR
= −L · Γ · (Γ− L) · r
′
u ·X3
C · rR ,
dn
dτ
= −n · Γ · (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X3
rR
= −l · Γ · (Γ− l) · r
′
u ·X3
C · rR .
Thus, we have proven every claim of the lemma except for welfare.
As to individual welfare, for a Gulliver country it can be written as
W G
L
= L · u (X) +K · u (Y )
C (Q)
+ l · (k + 1) · u (z)
C (q)
.
Differentiating this expression and substituting the derivatives obtained, we get
1
L
· dW
G
dτ
= L ·
u′ (X) · dXdτ +K · u′ (Y ) · dYdτ
C (Q)
− u (X) +K · u (Y )
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · dQ
dτ
+
+l · (k + 1) ·
u′ (z) · dzdτ
C (q)
− u (z)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · dq
dτ
 =
=
u′
C
·
(
L · dX
dτ
+K · L · dY
dτ
+ l · (k + 1) · dz
dτ
)
− u · C
′
C2
·
(
L · (K + 1) · dQ
dτ
+ l · (k + 1) · dq
dτ
)
=
(substituting (34)–(36))
= −X
rR
· u
′
C
· (L · (EΛ + Ew) +K · L · (EΛ + Ew + 1) + l · (k + 1) · (EΛ + 1))−
−u · C
′
C2
· r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER · (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) .
Now, substituting (31) and (33) we get
1
L
· dW
G
dτ
=
= −X
rR
·u
′
C
·
(
Γ ·
(
− l · (k + 1)
Γ
· L− l
Γ
· rR − 1
ER + rR
· ER − Γ− l
Γ
· ER
)
+ L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· ER + Γ− L
)
−
−u · EC
Γ · C ·
r′u ·X
rR · ER · (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) =
= −X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
− (Γ− l)
)
· ER−
−X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
−l · (k + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR − 1
ER + rR
· ER + Γ− L
)
−
− u
Γ · C ·
r′u ·X
rR
· (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) =
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= −X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
− (Γ− l)
)
· ER · (ER + rR − 1)
ER + rR
−
−X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
− (Γ− l)
)
· ER
ER + rR
−
−X
rR
· u
′
C
·
l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
·ER − l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
·ER · rR + (Γ− L) · (ER + rR)
ER + rR
−
− u
Γ · C ·
r′u ·X
rR
· (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) =
= −X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
− (Γ− l)
)
· (r′u ·X + ER)
ER + rR
−
−X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
+ Γ− L
)
· ER +
(
Γ− L− l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
·ER
)
· rR
ER + rR
−
− u
Γ · C ·
r′u ·X
rR
· (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) =
(because L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
− (Γ− l) = −
(
l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
+ Γ− L
)
)
= −X
rR
· u
′
Γ · C ·
(L · (K + 1) · (L− l)− Γ · (Γ− l)) · r′u ·X
ER + rR
−
−X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
Γ− L− l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
+ l · (k + 1) ·L− l
Γ
·ru
)
ER + rR
· rR−
− u
Γ · C ·
r′u ·X
rR
· (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) =
(because Γ · (Γ− L)− l · (k + 1) · (L− l) = Γ · L ·K + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− L+ l))
=
X
rR
· u
′ · r′u ·X
Γ · C ·
(L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l))
ER + rR
−
−X
rR
· u
′
Γ · C ·
(Γ · L ·K + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− L+ l) + l · (k + 1) · (L− l) ·ru)
ER + rR
· rR−
− u
Γ · C ·
r′u ·X
rR
· (L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l)) =
= −X
rR
· u
′
Γ · C ·
Γ · L ·K + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− L+ l) + l · (k + 1) · (L− l) ·ru
ER + rR
· rR+
+
(L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l))
ER + rR
· r
′
u ·X · u
rR · Γ · C · (Eu − (ER + rR)) =
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= −X
rR
· u
′
Γ · C ·
Γ · L ·K + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− L+ l) + l · (k + 1) · (L− l) ·ru
ER + rR
· rR+
−(L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L) + l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l))
ER + rR
· r
′
u ·X · u
rR · Γ · C ·
(
1− Eu + r
′
u ·X
ER
)
=
= − u
Γ · C · rR ·
(
AG +BG · r′u ·X
)
,
where AG > 0 and BG are introduced in (39) and (40). Hence if r′u ≥ 0 then
dW G
dτ
> 0, since
Eu < 1.
Analogously to Gullivers, we express individual welfare for a Lilliputian as
WL
l
= n · (u (x) + k · l · u (y)) +N · (K + 1)u (Z) = l · u (x) + k · u (y)
C (q)
+ L · (K + 1) · u (Z)
C (Q)
.
We similarly differentiate and transform it as
1
l
· dW
L
dτ
= l ·
u′ (x) · dxdτ + k · u′ (y) · dydτ
C (q)
− u (x) + k · u (y)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · dq
dτ
+
+L · (K + 1) ·
u′ (Z) · dZdτ
C (Q)
− u (Z)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · dQ
dτ
 =
=
u′
C
·
(
l ·
(
dx
dτ
+ k · dy
dτ
)
+ L · (K + 1) · dZ
dτ
)
− u · C
′
C2
·
(
l · (k + 1) · dq
dτ
+ L · (K + 1) · dQ
dτ
)
=
= −X
rR
· u
′
C
· (l · (Eλ + k · (Eλ + 1)) + L · (K + 1) · (Eλ + Ew + 1))−
−u · C
′
C2
· r
′
u ·X2
rR · ER · (l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l) + L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L)) =
= −X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
L · (K + 1) · rR − 1
ER + rR
· Ew − (Γ− l) · ER + L · (K + 1) · Ew + Γ− l
)
−
−u · C
′ ·Q
Γ · C2 ·
r′u ·X
rR · ER · (l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l) + L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L)) =
= −X
rR
· u
′
C
·
(
L · (K + 1) ·
(
rR
ER + rR
+
ER + rR − 1
ER + rR
)
· Ew + (Γ− l) · (1− ER)
)
−
−u · r
′
u ·X
Γ · C · rR · (l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l) + L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L)) =
= −u · Eu
C · rR ·
(
L · (K + 1) · L− l
Γ
· rR · ER
ER + rR
+ (Γ− l) · ru
)
−
−u · Eu
C · rR ·
L · (K + 1) · (L− l)
Γ · (ER + rR) · r
′
u ·X−
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−u · r
′
u ·X
Γ · C · rR · (l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l) + L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L)) =
= − u · Eu
Γ · C · rR ·
(
L · (K + 1) · (L− l) · rR · ER
ER + rR
+ Γ · (Γ− l) · ru
)
−
−
(
L · (K + 1) · (L− l) · Eu
ER + rR
+ l · (k + 1) · (Γ− l) + L · (K + 1) · (Γ− L)
)
· u · r
′
u ·X
Γ · C · rR =
= − u
Γ · C · rR ·
(
AL +BL · r′u ·X
)
,
where AL and BL are defined in (41) and (42).
Hence, if r′u ≥ 0 then
dWL
dτ
< 0, that competes the proof of Lemma 2. Using it and related
Remark we immediately obtain Proposition 1.
4.4 Proof of Proposition 2: Total autarky
Recall notations for trade freeness φ ≡ 1/τ . Also, to encompass any pairs of countries trading:
(Lilliputian-Lilliputian), (Gulliver-Gulliver) or (Gulliver-Lilliputian), we replace, with a little
abuse of notation, our upper-case notations X, N with lower-case letters xj, nj and denote all
imports (Y or Z or z or y)— by yij where i, j ∈ {G ,L }.
Recall also formulation of
Proposition 2. Starting from complete autarky φaut, when trade liberalization begins,18 and
some two countries of types i, j ∈ {G ,L } start trading, the local reaction of domestic consump-
tions xi, xj is negligible (
(
dxk/dφ
) |φ=φaut = 0, k ∈ {G ,L }); consumption of import increases
((dyij/dφ) |φ=φaut > 0, i, j ∈ {G ,L }), whereas the masses of firms and welfare decrease in both
countries:
dnk
dφ
|φ=φaut < 0, dW
k
dφ
|φ=φaut < 0, k ∈ {G ,L }.
So, there is a right neighborhood [φaut, φ) of point φaut where (in comparison with autarky)
new-born trade brings harm to both trading countries, and does not affect non-trading countries.
Proof. Partial or complete autarky means that some trade terminates, autarky is “complete”
when any international trade stops. In principle, at final point τ3 of trade, there can be three
cases of trade termination, expressed through ε→ +0:
I) At τ3 trade among countriesL stops: Y (τ3 − ε) = Z (τ3 − ε) = z (τ3 − ε) = 0, y (τ3 − ε)→
0;
II) At τ3 trade among countries G and L stops Y (τ3 − ε) = y (τ3 − ε) = 0, Z (τ3 − ε) →
0, z (τ3 − ε)→ 0;
III) At τ3 trade among countries of type G stops y (τ3 − ε) = Z (τ3 − ε) = z (τ3 − ε) =
0, Y (τ3 − ε)→ 0.
Obviously, in Case I), X,Q,N,W G are constant w.r.t. τ on interval [τ2, τ3] and these variable
play no role here. Analogously, in Case II), y, Y, are constant w.r.t. τ on [τ2, τ3], and in Case
III), x, q, n,WL are constant w.r.t. τ on [τ2, τ3].
18Trade liberalization means that trade cost τ decreases, φ increases.
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To prove Proposition 2 we study behavior of equilibrium under trade liberalization, i.e., when
φ increases, i.e., when τ = 1/φ decreases. Using the formula for the derivative of a composite
function,
τ = 1/φ =⇒ d
dφ
(
g
(
1
φ
))
= −dg
dτ
· 1
φ2
,
we conclude that the derivative of an equilibrium variable w.r.t. φ has the opposite sign with
the derivative of this variable w.r.t. τ . Hence we can directly use the results of comparative
statics w.r.t. τ (Lemma 1). So, the following lemma allows us to proof Proposition 2.
Lemma 3. At final point τ3 of trade, leading to complete autarky, the total elasticities and
derivatives of variables w.r.t. τ have the following values
• in case (I) the total elasticities and derivatives are
Eλ = EΛ = dx
dτ
= 0,
dy
dτ
=
R′ (y)
R′′ (y)
· 1
τ
< 0, En = −k · l · c · τ
2
C (q)
· dy
dτ
> 0,
dq
dτ
= k · l · τ · dy
dτ
< 0,
dWL
dτ
= k · l2 · τ · u (x) · ER (x)
x
· Eu (x)− 1
C (q)
· dy
dτ
> 0;
• in case (II) the total elasticities and derivatives are
Eλ = EΛ + Ew = dX
dτ
=
dx
dτ
= 0, Ew =
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q) − w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
∈ (−1, 1) ,
dZ
dτ
=
2
τ
· R
′ (Z)
λ · C (q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
< 0,
dz
dτ
= w · C (q)
C (Q)
·dZ
dτ
< 0,
dQ
dτ
= l · (k + 1) · τ · dZ
dτ
< 0,
dq
dτ
= L · (K + 1) · τ · dz
dτ
< 0,
EN = −l · (k + 1) · c · τ
2
C (Q)
· dZ
dτ
> 0, En = −L · (K + 1) · c · τ
2
C (q)
· dz
dτ
> 0,
dW G
dτ
= L · l · (k + 1) · w · R
′ (z)
C (Q)
· Eu (X)− 1
Eu (X)
· dZ
dτ
> 0,
dWL
dτ
= L · l · (K + 1) · 1
w
· R
′ (Z)
C (q)
· Eu (x)− 1
Eu (x)
· dz
dτ
> 0;
• in case (III) the total elasticities and derivatives are
Eλ = EΛ = dX
dτ
= 0,
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dY
dτ
=
1
τ
· R
′ (Y )
R′′ (Y )
< 0, EN = −K · L · c · τ
2
C (Q)
· dY
dτ
> 0,
dQ
dτ
= K · L · τ · dY
dτ
< 0,
dW G
dτ
= L2 ·K · u (X) · ER (X)
X
· τ · Eu (X)− 1
C (Q)
· dY
dτ
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.19 Since
Q (τ3) = L ·X (τ3) , q (τ3) = l · x (τ3) ,
our FOC and free entry condition yield
ER (X (τ3)) = EC (Q (τ3)) , ER (x (τ3)) = EC (q (τ3)) .
Case (I): complete autarky arise in symmetric trade among small countries
through y (τ)→ 0 (τ → τ3). In this case, near τ ≈ τ3 we have
Q = L ·X, q = l · x+ k · τ · l · y,
Π = L · R (X)
Λ
− w · C (Q) , pi = l · R (x)
λ
+ k · l · R (y)
λ
− C (q) ,
where wage w is considered as constant, because in countries G any trade has terminated before,
they are out of consideration. This allows to ignore variables X, Y,Λ, z, Z, w in analysis of case
I, they become independent of τ in the neighborhood of τ3.
Equilibrium equations w.r.t. remaining variables (x, y, λ) are ∂pi
∂x
= 0, ∂pi
∂y
= 0, pi = 0,
i.e.,
R′ (x)
λ
= C ′,
R′ (y)
λ
= τ · C ′,
l · R (x)
λ
+ k · l · R (y)
λ
= C (q) , q = lx+ τ lky.
From Lemma 1 (setting Ew = 0) we get
dx
dτ
=
1
τ
· Eλ
R′′ (x)
R′ (x)
,
dy
dτ
=
1
τ
· Eλ + 1
R′′ (y)
R′ (y)
,
dq
dτ
= l · dx
dτ
+ k · l ·
(
y + τ · − − dy
dτ
)
,
l ·
(
R (x)
λ
+ k · R (y)
λ
)
· Eλ = 0.
Hence,
EΛ = Eλ = dX
dτ
=
dx
dτ
=
dQ
dτ
= 0,
dy
dτ
=
R′ (y)
R′′ (y)
· 1
τ
< 0,
dq
dτ
= k · l · τ · dy
dτ
< 0.
19More detailed proof of the lemma can be found in [Bykadorov et al., 2015c].
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As to mass of firms, from the labor balance we get
En = E( lC(q)) = −EC(q) = −EC (q) · Eq = −EC (q) ·
dq
dτ
· τ
q
=
= −EC (q) · k · l · τ · dy
dτ
· τ
q
= −k · l · c · τ
2
C (q)
· dy
dτ
> 0.
For G -countries, trivially, dWG
dτ
= 0, while for L -countries we differentiate the welfare function
WL = l2 · u (x) + k · u (y)
C (l · x+ l · k · y)
and get
1
k · l2 ·
dWL
dτ
=
1
k
·
(
u′ (x) · dx
dτ
+ k · u′ (y) · dy
dτ
)
· C (q)− (u (x) + k · u (y)) · C ′ · dq
dτ
(C (q))2
=
=
1
k
·
(
u′ (x) · dx
dτ
+ k · u′ (y) · dy
dτ
)
· C (q)− (u (x) + k · u (y)) · C ′ · l ·
(
dx
dτ
+ k ·
(
τ · dy
dτ
+ y
))
(C (q))2
=
=
u′ (y) · C (q)− u (x) · C ′ (q) · l · τ
(C (q))2
· dy
dτ
=
R′ (y) · C (q)− u (x) · C ′ (q) · l · τ
(C (q))2
· dy
dτ
=
=
τ ·R′ (x) · C (q)− u (x) · C ′ (q) · l · τ
(C (q))2
·dy
dτ
=
τ · u′ (x) · ER (x) · C (q)− u (x) · C ′ (q) · l · τ
(C (q))2
·dy
dτ
=
= τ · u (x)
x
·
u′ (x) · x
u (x)
· ER (x)− C
′ (q) · q
C (q)
C (q)
· dy
dτ
= τ · u (x)
x
· Eu (x) · ER (x)− EC (q)
C (q)
· dy
dτ
=
= τ · u (x)
x
· Eu (x) · ER (x)− ER (x)
C (q)
· dy
dτ
= τ · u (x)
x
· ER (x) · Eu (x)− 1
C (q)
· dy
dτ
> 0,
which expresses the welfare gain from increasing trade cost, that we are proving.
Case (II): complete autarky arise in asymmetric trade among big and small
countries through z (τ) → 0, Z (τ) → 0 (τ → τ3). In this case, near τ ≈ τ3 we have Y =
0, y = 0,
Q = L ·X + (k + 1) · τ · l · Z, q = l · x+ (K + 1) · τ · L · z,
Π = L · R (X)
Λ
+ (k + 1) · l · R (Z)
λ
− w · C (Q) , pi = l · R (x)
λ
+ (K + 1) · L · R (z)
Λ
− C (q) ,
W G = L ·
(
L · u (X)
C (Q)
+ l · (k + 1) · u (z)
C (q)
)
, WL = l ·
(
l · u (x)
C (q)
+ L · (K + 1) · u (Z)
C (Q)
)
,
equilibrium equations w.r.t. (X,Z, x, z,Λ, λ, w) are
∂Π
∂X
= 0,
∂Π
∂Z
= 0,
∂pi
∂x
= 0,
∂pi
∂z
= 0, Π = 0, pi = 0, TB = 0,
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i.e.,
R′ (X)
Λ
= w · C ′, R
′ (Z)
λ
= τ · w · C ′, R
′ (x)
λ
= C ′,
R′ (z)
Λ
= τ · C ′,
L · R (X)
Λ
+ (k + 1) · l · R (Z)
λ
= w · C (Q) , l · R (x)
λ
+ (K + 1) · L · R (z)
Λ
= C (q) ,
R (Z)
λ · C (Q) −
R (z)
Λ · C (q) = 0.
Using comparative statics of Lemma 1, using FOC and linearity of costs we get several equations
and signs of derivatives:
EΛ + Ew = Eλ = 0, Ew =
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q) − w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
,
dX
dτ
=
dx
dτ
= 0,
dZ
dτ
=
R′ (Z)
R′′ (Z)
· 1
τ
· (1 + Ew) =
2
τ
· R
′ (Z)
λ · C (q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
< 0,
dz
dτ
=
R′ (z)
R′′ (z)
· 1
τ
· (1− Ew) =
2
τ
· w2· R
′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
=
=
2
τ
· R
′ (Z)
λ · C (q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
· w2·R
′ (z)
R′ (Z)
· λ · C (q)
Λ · C (Q) =
=
2
τ
· R
′ (Z)
λ · C (q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
· w2 · 1
w
·Λ
λ
· λ · C (q)
Λ · C (Q) = w ·
C (q)
C (Q)
·dZ
dτ
< 0.
Similarly we estimate the derivatives of outputs:
dQ
dτ
= l · (k + 1) · τ · dZ
dτ
= 2 · l · (k + 1) ·
R′ (Z)
λ · C (q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
< 0,
dq
dτ
= L · (K + 1) · τ · dz
dτ
= 2 · L · (K + 1) ·
w2· R
′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
R′′ (Z)
λ · C (q)+w
2· R
′′ (z)
Λ · C (Q)
< 0.
As to mass of firms, from labor balances we get
EN = −EC(Q) = −EC (Q) · EQ = −EC (Q) · dQ
dτ
· τ
Q
=
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= −EC (Q) · l · (k + 1) · τ · dZ
dτ
· τ
Q
= −l · (k + 1) · c · τ
2
C (Q)
· dZ
dτ
> 0,
En = −EC(q) = −EC (q) · Eq = −EC (q) · dq
dτ
· τ
q
=
= −EC (q) · L · (K + 1) · τ · dz
dτ
· τ
q
= −L · (K + 1) · c · τ
2
C (q)
· dz
dτ
> 0.
Now we can express the total derivative of welfare in G as
1
L
· dW
G
dτ
= L ·
(
u′ (X)
C (Q)
· dX
dτ
− u (X)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · dQ
dτ
)
+
+l · (k + 1) ·
(
u′ (z)
C (q)
· dz
dτ
− u (z)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · dq
dτ
)
=
= −L · u (X)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · dQ
dτ
+ l · (k + 1) · u
′ (z)
C (q)
· dz
dτ
=
= −L · u (X)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · l · (k + 1) · τ · dZ
dτ
+ l · (k + 1) · u
′ (z)
C (q)
· dz
dτ
=
= l · (k + 1) ·
(
−L · u (X)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · τ · dZ
dτ
+
u′ (z)
C (q)
· dz
dτ
)
=
= l · (k + 1) ·
(
−L · u (X)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · τ · dZ
dτ
+
u′ (z)
C (q)
· w · C (q)
C (Q)
·dZ
dτ
)
=
= l · (k + 1) · w
C (Q)
·
(
−L · u (X) · C
′ (Q)
C (Q)
· τ
w
+ u′ (z)
)
· dZ
dτ
=
(using the fact that R (X) ≡ u(X) · Eu (X))
= l · (k + 1) · w
C (Q)
·
(
−L · C
′ (Q) ·R (X)
C (Q) · Eu (X) ·
τ
w
+ u′ (z)
)
· dZ
dτ
=
(simplifying this due to zero-profit condition at autarky: L ·R (X) = Λ · w · C (Q))
= l · (k + 1) · w
C (Q)
·
(
− C
′ (Q)
Eu (X)
· τ · Λ + u′ (z)
)
· dZ
dτ
=
(because at autarky R′ (z) = u′ (z) · (1− ru(z)) = u′ (z) · (1− ru(0)) = u′ (z))
= l · (k + 1) · w
C (Q)
·
(
− C
′ (Q)
Eu (X)
· τ · Λ +R′ (z)
)
· dZ
dτ
=
(due to linearity of costs: C ′ (Q) = C ′ (q) = c)
= l · (k + 1) · w
C (Q)
·
(
− C
′ (q)
Eu (X)
· τ · Λ +R′ (z)
)
· dZ
dτ
=
(due to producer’s FOC at autarky C ′ (q) · τ · Λ = R′ (z))
= l · (k + 1) · w
C (Q)
·
(
− R
′ (z)
Eu (X)
+R′ (z)
)
· dZ
dτ
=
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= l · (k + 1) · R
′ (z) · w
C (Q)
· Eu (X)− 1
Eu (X)
· dZ
dτ
> 0,
since Eu (X) < 1. This expresses the welfare gain in country G from increasing trade cost, that
we are proving.
Analogously,
1
l
· dW
L
dτ
= l ·
(
u′ (x)
C (q)
· dx
dτ
− u (x)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · dq
dτ
)
+
+L · (K + 1) ·
(
u′ (Z)
C (Q)
· dZ
dτ
− u (Z)
(C (Q))2
· C ′ (Q) · dQ
dτ
)
=
= −l · u (x)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · dq
dτ
+ L · (K + 1) · u
′ (Z)
C (Q)
· dZ
dτ
=
= −l · u (x)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · L · (K + 1) · τ · dz
dτ
+ L · (K + 1) · u
′ (Z)
C (Q)
· dZ
dτ
=
= L · (K + 1) ·
(
−l · u (x)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · τ · dz
dτ
+
u′ (Z)
C (Q)
· dZ
dτ
)
=
= L · (K + 1) ·
(
−l · u (x)
(C (q))2
· C ′ (q) · τ · dz
dτ
+
u′ (Z)
C (Q)
· 1
w
· C (Q)
C (q)
· dz
dτ
)
=
= L · (K + 1) · 1
C (q)
·
(
−l · u (x) · C
′ (q)
C (q)
· τ + u
′ (Z)
w
)
· dz
dτ
=
= L · (K + 1) · 1
C (q)
·
(
−l · R (x)
Eu (x)
· C
′ (q)
C (q)
· τ + R
′ (Z)
w
)
· dz
dτ
=
= L · (K + 1) · 1
C (q)
·
(
− C
′ (q)
Eu (x)
· τ · λ+ R
′ (Z)
w
)
· dz
dτ
=
= L · (K + 1) · 1
C (q)
·
(
− 1
Eu (x)
· R
′ (Z)
w
+
R′ (Z)
w
)
· dz
dτ
=
= L · (K + 1) · 1
C (q)
· R
′ (Z)
w
· Eu (x)− 1
Eu (x)
· dz
dτ
> 0,
which expresses the welfare gain in country L from increasing trade cost, that we are proving.
Case (III): complete autarky arise in symmetric trade among big countries
through Y (τ)→ 0 (τ → τ3). This case is analogous to case (I).
Thus, the Lemma is proven, and Proposition 2 follows from it evidently.
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